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Kathleen McGarry and Andrew Davenport 
Over the past few decades, the financial status of the elderly improved dramati- 
cally. Poverty rates for those aged 65 or over fell from 25 percent in  1970 to 
14 percent in 1994. These gains are attributed in large part to increases in the 
generosity of the social security program. Yet, despite the inclusiveness of the 
social security system and the progressivity of the benefit schedule, some sub- 
groups of the elderly continue to face disproportionately high risks of poverty. 
Unmarried women,  for example, had  a poverty rate of  22 percent  in  1994, 
while the poverty rate for married women was 5 percent. Similarly, the poverty 
rate for elderly blacks is close to three times that for elderly whites (31 vs. 
12 percent). 
Social security is just one component of retirement income, and given the 
structure of benefits, differences across individuals in the level of social secu- 
rity  wealth  are likely to be  small in comparison to differences in the other 
components of total wealth. For example, despite large differences in lifetime 
income, the difference in mean social security benefits between retired blacks 
and  retired  whites  is  about  $100 a  month  (Social  Security Administration 
1990). Given average life expectancies for the two groups at age 65 (for males), 
and a real interest rate of 3 percent, the difference in social security wealth is 
just $35,000. The large differences in economic well-being within the elderly 
population therefore stem from differences in the other modes of savings. 
Recently, much has been written about differences in net worth and savings 
behavior between different groups of elderly individuals (Smith 1995).’ Less 
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1. Throughout the paper we will use the term “net worth to denote nonpension, non-social 
security (and non-human  capital) wealth. 
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well studied are differences in pension wealth and the interaction of pensions 
and individual wealth. In this paper we use data from the Health and Retire- 
ment Survey (HRS) to focus on differences in pension wealth for various sub- 
groups of the retirement age population. We ask how pensions affect the distri- 
bution of wealth in the population. If individuals who have claims to pensions 
save less on their own as a result, then the inclusion of pension  wealth with 
other assets may reduce inequality. Conversely, if a pension is just one compo- 
nent of a good job, then those with pensions will also have higher income and 
higher wealth than  those without,  and the inclusion of  pension  wealth  may 
exacerbate wealth inequalities. We compare the distribution of net worth to the 
distribution  of private  wealth  (net worth plus pension  wealth). We  find that 
the addition of pension wealth broadly reduces inequality but affects different 
subgroups of the population to different degrees: single men fare better with 
the inclusion of pension  wealth, while single women fare worse. The differ- 
ences by race are small. 
Section 11.1 gives an overview of the pension data available in the HRS and 
discusses  the assumptions  we use to calculate  pension  wealth. Section  11.2 
presents some broad descriptive characteristics  of pension plans and patterns 
of ownership in our sample, section 11.3 analyzes the pension wealth of  indi- 
viduals,  and  section  11.4 focuses on the distribution  of  household  pension 
wealth in comparison with net worth. Section 11.5 concludes. 
11.1  Data 
The Health and Retirement Survey is a nationally representative sample of 
the population born between  1931 and 1941 and their spouses or partners. At 
the time of the first interview in 1992, respondents  were approximately aged 
5 1-6  1. They were therefore  approaching retirement  age or recently  retired. 
This sample is potentially more useful for analyzing the prevalence of pensions 
than random samples drawn from the entire population; older workers are more 
likely to be vested in a pension plan than are younger workers, they are more 
likely to be participating in an available plan, and they are more likely to be 
contemplating retirement. For these reasons they are also perhaps more knowl- 
edgeable about the characteristics of their pension plans. 
The survey provides information on important economic measures such as 
the components of income and wealth, measures of health status, information 
about the current job, and details of pension plans. A more detailed description 
of  the survey is contained in Juster and Suzman (1995). Here the aspects of 
the survey related to the calculation of pension wealth will be described. We 
devote much time to explaining the assumptions used in our calculations in the 
hope that they will attract attention to the rich data requirements and perhaps 
begin a discussion of the standard assumptions that should be used with these 
data. 
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The first section asks about up to three pension plans on the current job. The 
definition of pensions in the HRS is broad. 
Now I’d like to ask about pension or retirement plans on your job sponsored 
by your employer or union. This includes not only basic pension or retire- 
ment plans, but also tax-deferred plans like thrift, savings, 401k, deferred 
profit-sharing, or stock ownership plans. [Emphasis in original] 
For each of these plans workers are asked whether the plan is a defined contri- 
bution (DC) plan, a defined benefit (DB) plan, or a plan that combines aspects 
of both DC and DB plans. The survey then branches to ask questions particular 
to the type of pension. DC plan holders are asked for the current balance in 
their accounts, the amount of money they contribute to the account, and the 
amount of their employers’ contributions. The structure of DB plans results in 
more elaborate questioning schemes. Great care is taken in the survey to un- 
cover the important nuances of the plans. Respondents with DB plans are asked 
first to report the age at which they expect to begin receiving a pension  and 
the amount they expect to receive, either as a specific payment or as a percent- 
age of final salary (expected final salary is also reported). In addition to bene- 
fits at this age, respondents are asked to report the earliest age at which they 
could receive full (unreduced) benefits and the amount of full benefits, as well 
as the age at which they can first receive any benefit and the reduction relative 
to full benefik2  As a first step to understanding  the distribution  of pension 
wealth, our analysis focuses on the value of pension wealth at the age at which 
respondents expect to receive benefits.) 
For those not currently working, a subsequent  section of  the survey asks 
about pensions on the last job. In this section respondents are asked whether 
they had a DC or DB plan and, accordingly, the amount in a DC account when 
they left the employer, whether they are currently receiving benefits from a DB 
plan, or when they expect to receive benefits.  For those currently  receiving 
benefits the amount is obtained, as well as the date at which they started receiv- 
ing the pension, and whether the pension was ever adjusted for inflation. For 
those who are not yet receiving benefits, the survey asks at what age they ex- 
pect to receive benefits and how much their benefit will be. Questions about 
the earliest age at which pensions could be received are also asked, but neither 
the amount nor the age at which they qualify for full benefits was obtained. 
A final section asks an identical set of questions for (up to three) past jobs 
2. It is not clear in any of these questions whether the amount is in current or future dollars. We 
assume future income is reported in future dollars. 
3. We choose to examine pension wealth based on the “expected age” in part to impose consis- 
tency between participants in DC plans, who were asked only about the age at which they expect 
to begin drawing benefits, and those in  DB plans, and in part because this age provides the best 
approximation of the resources eventually available to the individual. Individuals may opt to col- 
lect benefits at ages that do not maximize pension wealth for a variety of reasons, such as the need 
to make the decision jointly with a spouse or because of health concerns. If pension wealth differs 
across sectors of the population for these reasons, that difference, in and of  itself, is interesting. 466  Kathleen McGarry and Andrew Davenport 
that lasted  five or more years. This section is asked  both for those who are 
currently working and for those who are no longer employed. 
From these three sections a complete pension history  can be constructed. 
We calculate pension wealth for both DB and DC plans at the age at which the 
individual expects to begin receiving benefits and discount that value to current 
dollars. We therefore ignore any possibility that the worker separates from the 
firm before the expected retirement date or that the characteristics of the plan 
change during that time. We do not subtract a worker’s own contributions from 
either DB or DC plans, although these amounts are known. Because we seek 
to analyze the portion of wealth “tied up” in pensioris and not to comment on 
the relative compensation levels across individuals or firms, we believe this 
procedure is valid. 
To  convert the  flow from a DB plan  into a stock  of  wealth  we use age- 
specific life tables4  We assume a 3 percent real rate of  return and 4 percent 
inflation. Because we do not know whether pensions  on the current job are 
indexed for inflation, we treat only government pensions as indexed. In calcu- 
lating pension wealth from past jobs we treat a pension as being defined in real 
terms if the respondent answers yes to the question, “Are the benefits adjusted 
for changes in the cost of living?’ By this method 46 percent of pensions from 
past jobs are inde~ed.~  The large number of workers who claim that their pen- 
sions adjust for inflation contradicts results of past studies. Kotlikoff and Smith 
find that approximately 3 percent of pension recipients are in plans that provide 
automatic  adjustments  for inflation  (1983,  274). Quinn (1982) reports data 
from Munnell and Connolly (1979) that only 6 percent of private pension plans 
contain built-in provisions for inflation adjustments.h 
For DC plans we assume that wages grow with inflation but are flat in real 
terms.’ We add employer and employee contributions in each year to the cur- 
rent balance and discount back to the current period. 
An important omission in the HRS wave  1 data is the failure to determine 
4.  It is not obvious whether age-specific or age-, race-, and sex-specific life tables are preferred. 
Using separate life expectancies by  sex implies that males and females with identical pension 
plans retiring at the same age will have different values of pension wealth. Because women live 
longer than men on average, ceteris paribus the value of pension wealth for women will be higher 
than that for men if detailed life tables are used. By a similar argument, the pension wealth of 
blacks will be lowered relative to whites if a life table that differs by  race is used. Smith (1995) 
uses life tables by  age, race, and sex, while Gustman et al. (1997) use those controlling for age 
alone. An earlier version of this paper (McGarry and Davenport 1996) used age-, race-, and sex- 
specific tables. We note the differences between the two calculations at several points in the paper. 
5.  A second question asks whether benefits had ever been adjusted for inflation. Of those who 
answered no to the first question,  13 percent said that their pensions had been adjusted at least 
once. We do not alter our calculations based on this second response. 
6. We expect that the difference comes from the wording of the question. The HRS asks whether 
benefits are adjusted, not whether the adjustment is automatic. Pensions without cost-of-living 
adjustment clauses are often adjusted on an ad hoc basis (Allen, Clark, and Sumner 1986). 
7. Wage regressions point to a flattening of the wage profile with age. Murphy and Welch (1990) 
show wages beginning to fall after about 25 years of experience, corresponding to an age similar 
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whether the reported pension benefit would be paid to the worker’s widow(er) 
should he or she die.8 We expect that some reported benefits would be calcu- 
lated based on single life, and some using joint ~urvivorship.~  Because we have 
no way  to impute this  information,  we  calculate  two measures  of  pension 
wealth. Under the assumption that pensions are single life, we use the survival 
probabilities appropriate for the owner of the pension. For joint and survivor 
pensions, we use the survival probabilities of the couple. On average, for all 
married individuals, pension wealth is 20 percent greater if we assume that the 
reported benefits are from a joint life policy than if they are from a single life 
policy  (benefits  for unmarried  individuals  are unchanged).  For the  sake of 
brevity we report only the single life values in this paper. The conclusions are 
qualitatively unchanged if  we use joint life values for couples, although the 
difference  in pension  wealth  between  married  and  single individuals  is, of 
course, increased. 
Much of our work in calculating pension wealth dealt with the handling of 
missing values. The HRS went to great effort to reduce the number of missing 
values. For many of the questions in the survey, including those used to calcu- 
late pension wealth, a respondent who could not report an exact answer was 
permitted to provide a categorical response based on a specified list of possible 
categories printed on a “range card.” For example, a respondent who had a DC 
plan, but who did not know the exact balance, could report that it was between 
$2,501 and $10,000, or $10,001 and $50,000, and so forth. In cases where 
respondents used the range card we impute an exact value with the mean over 
the valid responses in that interval. If the datum was completely missing (i.e., 
no information on range was available), we used regression procedures to im- 
pute a value.’O 
The  entire HRS  sample consists of  12,652  individuals,  including  age- 
ineligible spouses. For our discussion of  individual pension coverage and pen- 
sion wealth, we eliminate those who were not born between  1931 and  1941 
and who are therefore not part of the population representative sample. How- 
ever, when comparing pension wealth and net worth on a household level, we 
include the pension wealth of age-ineligible spouses. In addition to imposing 
the age restriction, we eliminate those who are self-employed (446), because 
their behavior and choices with respect  to pensions are likely to differ from 
8. Wave 2 of the HRS will obtain this information for those currently receiving benefits. Hence, 
it will be possible to calculate accurately pension wealth for all but those currently employed. 
9. Turner (1988) reports that in 1978 (post-ERISA, but pre-REACT) only about 40 percent of 
those with pensions had joint and survivor plans. More recent calculations, based on those first 
receiving benefits in 1989, place the percentage with survivorship benefits at 66 percent (Turner 
and Beller 1992). 
10. For many of the pension variables there are a large number of missing values; in some cases 
close to half of the respondents were unable to report a value. Those with missing values on the 
pension variables are typically worse off than those who report values and have less generous 
pensions. Failure to impute values therefore leads to incorrect inference about the characteristics 
of pensions. The appendix provides details of the imputation methods, including a table of  the 
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Table 11.1  Distribution of Pension Holdings 
Sample 
Percentage of Each Type of  Pland 
Covered by 
Pension ('9%)  DB Only  DC Only  Both 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Entire sample (n = 8,330) 
Ever workedh (n  = 6,429) 
Currently working (n  = 5,438) 
On current job (n  = 5,438) 
Males (n  = 3,674) 
Females (n = 4,656) 
Whites (n = 5,826) 
Nonwhites (n = 2,489) 





































"Percentages  in cols. (2), (3),  and (4)  do not sum to col. (I) due to missing values. Approximately 
2 percent report that they do not know what type of plan they have. 
b"Ever worked" is defined as either working currently or ever having held a job for five or more 
years. 
those who work for someone else,"  and those with missing information on 
pension status (48). With these restrictions our sample consists of 8,330 indi- 
viduals. 
11.2  Characteristics of Pensions 
Differences in pension wealth across the population stem from differences 
in who is covered by pensions, in the generosity of pension plans as measured 
by the dollar value of benefits, and in the age at which benefits are payable. In 
this section we present summaries of these characteristics for the entire sample 
and then focus on differences between subgroups of the population. 
Table  11.1 shows that in our sample of  8,330 individuals whose pension 
status is known, 66 percent  report  that they are covered by  a pension. Our 
measure of pension holdings includes pensions from any job, not just on the 
current job. Individuals may therefore have two or more plans and may have 
plans from different employers. In fact, 25 percent of the sample have pensions 
that are not from their most recent jobs (current  jobs if working). Many studies 
of pensions, in particular those based on firm-level data, miss this portion of 
pension wealth. Including all plans, 31 percent of the sample have DB plans 
only, 16 percent have DC plans only, and 17 percent  are in plans that are a 
11. The HRS specifically excluded Keogh plans in  the question on pensions and asked about 
them in a later section of  the survey. If  we do not count Keoghs, only 7 percent of self-employed 
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combination of the two types or have at least one of each type of plan.I2  Among 
those who have ever worked, the rate of pension coverage increases to 78 per- 
cent. Current workers have the highest coverage rate at 79 percent. Some por- 
tion of the 79 percent may have pensions from previous jobs. Coverage falls 
when we look only at pensions from the current job, and there is a noticeable 
change in  the proportion  of DB plans relative  to DC plans. This pattern  is 
consistent with recent trends toward DC plans; older plans from past jobs are 
more likely to be DB plans than are plans on a current job. 
These results show somewhat higher rates of coverage than do other studies. 
Bloom and Freeman (1992) use the 1992 Current Population Survey and deter- 
mine that 57 percent of all workers are covered by pension plans on their jobs, 
a figure significantly lower than our 67 percent. Even and Macpherson (1990) 
report coverage rates of 53 and 36 percent among employed men and women. 
Our greater coverage can be explained by the age of the HRS sample. Individu- 
als in their 50s are more likely to be participating in pensions than are younger 
workers, both because of vesting requirements and because of recent trends in 
pension availability. Even and Macpherson (1994b) calculate coverage rates of 
49.2 percent for male workers aged 21-35  in  1988, but 69 percent for those 
aged 36-55.  In a second paper that compares pension coverage for male and 
female workers in a 37-54-year-old  cohort (Even and Macpherson 1994a), the 
authors find rates of pension coverage of 73 percent for men and 58 percent 
for women. Our sample is drawn from a somewhat older population, and we 
therefore expect higher rates for both male and female workers. 
In our sample, men have coverage rates that are 30 percentage points higher 
than those for women. This difference is smaller than the gap of 4 1 percentage 
points found by Even and Macpherson (19944 using the Newly Entitled Bene- 
ficiary Survey. In the distribution of types of plans, women are much less likely 
than men to have DB plans only, or to have two different types of plans. DB 
plans  are typically thought of  as accompanying blue-collar  occupations, in 
which  women are underrepresented. The difference in the percentages  with 
both DB and DC plans can be similarly explained if these DC plans are supple- 
ments to a main DB plan. The difference in dual plans may also be due to the 
weaker attachment to the labor force of  women, making it unlikely that they 
would qualify for pensions from two emp10yers.I~  We do not explore the deter- 
minants of the difference here. 
We also find that nonwhites are less likely than whites to have pension cover- 
age, but  the  distribution  of  types  of  plans  is  more  similar for whites  and 
nonwhites than for men and women. 
In the last row of the table we combine observations for spouses. A house- 
12. For approximately 2 percent of the sample the type of plan is missing. We do not impute 
13. Only 17 percent of  women have pension coverage from a prior job, compared to 36 percent 
this variable. 
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Table 11.2  Means of Selected Variables by Pension Status 
Variable 
Type of  Plan4 
Covered by 
All  Pension  DB Only  DC Only  Both 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Age 
Sex (1 = male) 
Nonwhite 
Years of schooling 
Currently working 
Earnings (if > 0) 
Years on current job 
Household wealth 
(working) 






















































































Nore: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
”umbers  of observations in cols. (3). (4), and (5) do not sum to col. (2) due to missing values on 
type of  pension. Observations in some cells differ due to missing values. 
hold is considered to have a pension if either spouse reports pension coverage. 
“DB only” implies that at least one spouse has a DB plan and neither spouse 
has a DC plan; similarly, “DC only” implies that at least one has a DC plan 
and no one has a DB plan. “Both” means at least one of each type. The percent- 
age of households with at least one pension (78 percent) is equal to the percent- 
age of those who ever worked and have a pension. 
Table 11.2 highlights the differences between those with pension plans and 
the  entire  population  and  compares the  characteristics  of  pension  holders 
across types of plans.  Those with pensions  are significantly  more likely  to 
be male than the overall survey population, 0.56 compared to 0.44. Pension 
eligibles have an additional 0.8 years of  schooling relative to the population, 
higher earnings (among those with nonzero earnings), and longer tenure. Fam- 
ily wealth is slightly higher for those with pensions, likely as the result of a 
lifetime of higher earnings. This table provides a first indication that including 
pension wealth in the calculation of total wealth may not greatly  reduce in- 
equality. 
There are also differences based on type of plan. Consistent with table 11.1, 
those with DB plans are more likely to be male than are DC holders. They also 
have lower earnings (conditional on working) than those with DC plans. Again 
consistent with the differences in table 11.1, individuals with DB plans are less 471  Pensions and the Distribution of Wealth 
Table 11.3A  Details of Defined Benefit Plans 
25th  75th 
Characteristic  Mean  Percentile  Median  Percentile 
Expected benefit 
Agea  61.6 (0.17)  60  62  65 
Yearly benefit  14,146 (504)  5,400  12,000  20,400 
Earnings  34,233 (787)  22,256  32,000  42,000 
Ageb  58.1 (0.20)  55  59  62 
Yearly benefit  10,650 (438)  3,108  7,800  16,000 
Age‘  60.2 (0.19)  56  62  64 
Earliest benefit 
Full benefit 
Yearly benefit  13,702 (533)  4,896  10,800  20,000 
Note: The sample consists of  only those individuals providing a value for each variable in the 
table. Characteristics are reported for primary plan on current job only. 
“Expected benefit age is defined by  the question “At  what age do you expect to start receiving 
benefits from this plan?’ 
bEarliest benefit is defined by “What is the earliest age at which you could leave this employer and 
start receiving pension benefits?’ 
‘Full benefit age is defined by  “What is the earliest age at which you would be eligible to receive 
full or unreduced pension benefits from this job?’ 
Table 11.3B  Details of Defined Contribution Plans 
Characteristic 
25th  75th 
Mean  Percentile  Median  Percentile 
~  ~~~~  ~  ~~ 
Expected age of  receipt” 
Earnings (if nonzero) 
Balance in account 
Employee contnbution (% of salary) 
Employer contribution (% of salary) 
Employee contribution (S) 
Employer contnbution ($) 
63.11 (0.13)  62  62  65 
37,959 (2,941)  19,000  28,000  41,000 
35,022 (3,231)  3,000  10,000  29,000 
5.5 (0.70)  1.8  3.6  6.3 
6.9 (1  .00)  1.9  5.0  8.2 
1,988 (181)  406  1,186  2,496 
1,888 (206)  364  925  2,000 
Note: Characteristics reported for primary plan on current job only. 
“Expected age is defined by the question “At what age do you expect to start receiving QJI~  benefits 
from this plan?’ 
likely to be working than those with DC plans. Individuals with both plans 
appear to be the best off financially. They are the most likely to be male, have 
the greatest levels of schooling, wealth, earnings, and tenure, and are the most 
likely to be employed. 
The generosity of pension plans depends not only on the benefit to which 
the  worker is entitled but  also on the age at which he can first collect any 
benefits,  the age at which he can collect full benefits, and the magnitudes of 
the benefits. Table 11.3A summarizes these characteristics for individuals with 
DB plans, and table 11.3B presents similar descriptive characteristics for DC 472  Kathleen McGarry and Andrew Davenport 
plans.  The figures reported  in both  tables  11.3A and  11.3B are based  on a 
sample of individuals with reported (nonimputed) values for each variable in 
the table. 
The mean age at which individuals in DB plans expect  to begin receiving 
benefits is 61.6, the median age is 62, and the 25th and 75th quartiles are ages 
60 and 65. The expected yearly benefit is $14,146, compared to mean earnings 
of $34,233,  implying a “replacement rate” of 41 percent of current earnings. 
On average, the earliest age at which individuals can collect benefits is 58.1. 
Benefits calculated with this retirement date are substantially reduced relative 
to benefits at the expected retirement age, averaging just $10,650, or 75 percent 
of the expected level. Median benefits fall somewhat more sharply. 
The mean age at which an individual is first eligible for full benefits is less 
than the mean expected age of drawing benefits, 60.2 versus 61.6. Apparently 
many individuals expect to work longer than is necessary to qualify for unre- 
duced benefits. 
The distribution of retirement ages differs only slightly for men and women 
(not shown). The mean (median) expected age for men is 61.2 (62) compared 
to 62.2 (62) for women. A difference in ages at which men and women qualify 
for benefits is intuitive in that on average women have less tenure than men of 
the same age and may need to work to a slightly older age before becoming 
entitled to benefits. However, given the tendency for wives to retire with their 
husbands, and for husbands to be older than wives, the greater expected retire- 
ment age for women  is somewhat surprising. Earnings, yearly benefits, and 
replacement rates for women are lower than for men. This difference may point 
to a future change in the retirement patterns of  women as a greater number 
have sufficient commitment to the labor force to qualify for their own pensions. 
Expected earnings are $39,779 for men and $25,194 for women. Pension bene- 
fits average $17,194 and $9,181, respectively. 
Racial differences are smaller than differences by sex. There are no signifi- 
cant differences in the age variables by race, although expected benefits and 
earnings do differ. The mean values for earnings are $34,869 for whites and 
$30,476 for nonwhites. Benefits for the two groups are $14,370 and $12,797, 
indicating similar replacement rates. 
In DC plans (table 11.3B), the mean age at expected pension receipt is 63.1, 
slightly higher than for DB workers; the percentiles are also slightly higher. 
Contributions to DC accounts by firms, as a percentage of yearly earnings or 
as an absolute measure, are quite similar to individual contributions. The mean 
individual contribution  is $1,988 per  year  (including zeros), compared to a 
mean salary of $37,959. The mean employer contribution is $1,888. 
11.3  Individual Differences in Pension Wealth 
A primary goal of this paper is to compare pension wealth across segments 
of the population and, in particular, to compare the pension holdings of males 473  Pensions and the Distribution of Wealth 
and females and of whites and nonwhites.  In addition to sex differences, the 
literature  on pensions  has  paid  particular  attention  to  differences  between 
union and nonunion workers, and between public and private sector workers. 
Column (1) of table 11.4 presents the fraction of individuals with pension cov- 
erage by each of  these characteristics, as well as by  schooling level, health 
status, and income and wealth quartiles. Columns (2) through (4) report the 
distribution of pension wealth conditional on having a pension. 
The first row of the table presents the statistics for the entire sample. Mean 
pension wealth for the 66 percent of the sample with a pension is $109,596. 
The median  is just over half as large, indicating the skewness of the distri- 
bution.14 
Subsequent rows  divide the  sample along observable characteristics. We 
look first at differences by marital status and sex. In the literature on wage 
determination, married men are consistently found to have higher wages than 
unmarried  men. We see the  same pattern  with  pensions; married men  have 
pensions that are 50 percent higher at the mean than for the sample as a whole 
and 19 percent higher than for unmarried men.15 Coverage rates are lower for 
women than for men, but even conditional on coverage, women have signifi- 
cantly lower pension wealth, less than half that held by married men.16 Racial 
differences are as expected: nonwhites are 15 percentage points less likely to 
be covered by a pension than are whites and have pension wealth that is 83 
percent that of whites.” 
Those who are currently working are much more likely to have a pension 
than those who are not employed, but conditional on having  a pension, the 
differences in pension wealth are small, with those who are not working having 
slightly richer plans. It is likely that those with generous plans are the ones 
who could most afford to retire by the survey date. 
Differences  by  schooling  also  show  the  expected  patterns.  Those  with 
schooling beyond a college degree are twice as likely to have pension coverage 
as those with fewer than  12 years of schooling, and they have over three times 
more pension  wealth.  Because more schooled individuals are likely  to also 
have greater income and net worth, this large difference in pension wealth will 
add to the inequality of the income and wealth distributions. 
14. We remind the reader that these calculations assume that all reported DB benefits are based 
on single life. Because some fraction of the sample will have joint and survivor plans, our results 
should be viewed as lower hounds on the amount of pension wealth. Reversing our assumption 
and calculating pension wealth as if all plans were joint survivorship plans leads to mean pension 
wealth of $123,134.  All of this increase comes through increases in the pension wealth of married 
couples; the pension wealth of singles is assumed to be single life in both cases. 
15. The relative advantage of men is reduced when sex- and race-specific life tables are used. 
In that case, married males have pension wealth that is 32 percent higher than the mean for the 
entire sample. 
16. If  sex- and race-specific life tables are used, pension wealth for men is lower and that for 
women greater. The mean values for married men and women are 140,326 and 71,792. 
17. If  race-specific life tables are used, nonwhites have pension wealth that is 78 percent that 
of whites. Table 11.4  Pension Ownership and Pension Wealth 
Statistics over Positive Values 
Covered by  Standard 
Pension (%)  Median  Mean  Error 
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109,596  2,295 
148.366  3,724 
124.7 19  6,975 
68,327  3,839 
63,674  3,035 
114,437  2,782 
86,97  1  3,273 
106,360  2,3 14 
123,371  6,900 
66,688  3,316 
85,643  3,330 
114,536  4,745 
150,790  8,667 
199,892  8,374 
68.872  6,122 
78,745  4,142 
I0  1,022  4,77  1 
113,261  3,794 
134,517  5,093 
56,532  3,670 
82,078  4,178 
115,746  3,604 
153,936  5,466 
109,726  3,091 
104,737  3,137 
101,806  2,279 
159,456  10,430 
43,110  4,009 
53,253  2,372 
9 1.856  3,011 
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Much has been written  about the correlation  between  health  and wealth. 
Recently, the HRS has provided a good deal of information on the relationship; 
wealthier individuals are found to be in significantly better health than the less 
wealthy as measured by  subjective health status (Smith 1995), by  subjective 
probabilities of survival (Hurd and McGarry  1995), or by limitations with re- 
spect to activities of  daily living (McGany 1998). Here we see that the differ- 
ence is also present for pension wealth. Seventy-four percent of those in excel- 
lent health have pensions, compared to 43 percent whose self-reported health 
is poor, a difference of 31 percentage points. Differences in the mean values 
are large, with healthier individuals having  approximately twice the pension 
wealth of those in poor health. 
Differences in pension wealth by wealth quartile are large. Moving from the 
lowest to the highest wealth quartile increases the probability of coverage by 
28 percentage points and increases mean pension wealth by three times. 
Among those currently employed, union workers have greater pension cov- 
erage than nonunion workers, and greater pension wealth than nonunion work- 
ers throughout most of the distribution, although the means for the two groups 
are similar. Government workers have more coverage and greater benefits than 
nongovernment employees. Pension wealth also increases  sharply with total 
income.’x 
11.4  Distribution of Household Wealth 
Inequalities in the distribution of net worth are well known. In this section 
we compare the distribution of pension wealth to the distribution of net worth 
and examine the fraction of private wealth comprised by pensions. The discus- 
sion thus far has used the individual as the unit of analysis. Because pensions 
“belong” to an individual this focus is appropriate. However, household  net 
worth is not so easily assigned an owner. Therefore, in order to compare pen- 
sion  wealth  to  net  worth,  we  aggregate  pensions  of  husbands  and  wives 
to create a household  total. This aggregation  subsumes variation  within  the 
household. Comparing pension holdings of husbands and wives we find that 
in 48 percent of married households both spouses report having a pension, in 
37 percent only the husband has pension wealth, in 10 percent neither spouse 
has a pension, and in just 6 percent of households only the wife has a pension.19 
There is also a positive and  significant correlation  (0.16) between  pension 
wealth of spouses, although men are likely to have higher pensions. Seventy- 
eight percent of husbands have pension wealth greater than that of their wives. 
The median difference between pension wealth of the husband and that of the 
wife is $5 1,465. 
18. To  avoid contaminating the relationship with  differences in retirement patterns, income 
19. These numbers refer to married couples, not to all households as is reported in table 11.1. 
quartiles are measured only for those currently working. 
Married individuals are more likely to have pensions than nonmarried. 476  Kathleen McGarry and Andrew Davenport 
Table 11.5  Comparison of Means of Household Pension Wealth and Net Worth 
Pension  Net  Private  Pension/ 
Wealth  Worth  Wealth  Private Wealth 








Schooling (male in couple) 
Less than high school 
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352,943 
































Nofes: Sample consists of households with nonmissing values in  all columns and with neither 
spouse reporting being self-employed on the current job, or on the most recent job if not currently 
employed. N  = 4,938. Note that pension wealth is calculated based on the assumption that  no 
pensions are joint and survivorship. Assuming all pensions continue after the pension holder dies 
increases mean household pension wealth to $1 10,407. 
Table 11.5 reports mean household pension wealth, mean net worth, the sum 
of the two components (private wealth), and the fraction of private wealth that 
is due to pensions.  It has been observed that low savings rates among some 
segments of the population may be a result of individuals being “overannui- 
tized”  from social security. Low-income workers may be required by social 
security laws to “save” more than they would like during their lifetimes. The 
result of this forced savings is that they save little, if anything, elsewhere. Pen- 477  Pensions and the Distribution of Wealth 
sions provide a second annuity to most workers. We thus look to see whether 
low-income/wealth households hold a substantially greater fraction of wealth 
in pensions than in other assets relative to better-off households. 
In the first row, household pension wealth for the entire sample is $92,69 1  .*O 
This number is fairly consistent with past studies.21  The only other study we 
are aware of that calculates pension wealth asing self-reports in the HRS is 
Smith (1995). He finds mean pension wealth of $104,000 over all households 
using slightly different assumptions about interest rates, inflation, and survi- 
vorship benefits and different life tables.  If we assume that all pensions for 
married individuals are based on their joint life expectancy, our mean pension 
wealth for the sample increases to $110,407. Gustman et al. (1997) use em- 
ployer reports of pension benefits for the HRS sample and calculate pension 
wealth of $1 16,012, surprisingly similar to our results with employee-reported 
information. Over nonzero values  our household pension  wealth  values  are 
$137,056  (single  life)  and  $154,134  (joint  life),  which  are  similar  to  the 
McDermed, Clark, and Allen (1989) estimate from the  1983 Survey of Con- 
sumer Finances of $170,703 (converted to 1992 dollars). 
The net  worth reported in table  11.5 is lower than  in  some other studies 
using the HRS. The difference is due to the composition of  our sample. We 
exclude the self-employed from this study of pension wealth. Including those 
who are self-employed (either currently or in a past job) increases average net 
worth to $238,336.  The change  in  the  medians  is  smaller,  increasing  from 
$72,900 to $81,200 with the inclusion of the self-employed.  For comparison 
with private pensions, we also use reports on expected social security bene- 
fits in  the HRS to make  a rough  calculation of  social security  wealth  (not 
shown).  Mean  expected  social  security  wealth  for  the  sample  is  approxi- 
mately $95,000,22 
Differences in household pension wealth follow the differences illustrated 
in table 11.4. Married couples have far more pension wealth than singles, and 
single females lag greatly behind  single men. Note that the difference in net 
worth between single males and single females is much smaller than the differ- 
ence in pension wealth. The large fraction of private wealth for single women 
that is not from pensions may indicate a behavioral response on their part to 
save more in the absence of pension availability, or it may reflect a lump-sum 
award at the time of a spouse's death or 
Contrary to evidence of overannuitization presented elsewhere, the ratio of 
20. This number is lower than the value for individual pension wealth reported in table  I I .4 
because table 11.5 includes those with zero pension wealth. 
21. An exception is work done with the Retirement History Survey (RHS). Hurd and Shoven 
(1983) use the 1969 RHS and calculate household pension wealth of  $25,403 (converted to 1992 
dollars) for a sample with household heads aged 58-63. 
22. Gustman et al. (1997) calculate average social security wealth of $116,000. 
23. Pension wealth for widows is only $21,570, but their net worth is $104,786 (not shown). 478  Kathleen McGarry and Andrew Davenport 
pension wealth to total private wealth  is similar for whites (38 percent) and 
nonwhites (34 percent), although the levels are much greater for 
Both pension and nonpension wealth increase with schooling level, but pen- 
sion wealth increases at a greater rate. Thus the fraction of wealth that is from 
pensions increases from 25 percent to 46 percent as one moves from the lowest 
to the highest schooling category. 
We might  expect  unhealthy  individuals to have high  mortality  rates and 
therefore to wish to have little wealth in an annuity based on average life expec- 
tancies. In fact, we  see that for those  in poor health the  fraction  of  wealth 
coming from pensions is lower (21 percent) than for those in excellent health 
(43 percent), although it is also likely that the difference in pension wealth is 
due to a difference in the jobs held over the individuals’ lives.25 
As in table 11.4, pension wealth increases sharply with household income 
from $21,640 in the lowest quartile to $209,547 in the highest. Net worth also 
increases substantially with income quartiles, going from $68,572 to $3  19,737. 
Thus  the lowest  income quartile has  only  17 percent  of  the  private  wealth 
(non-social  security) of the highest.  These patterns are repeated for wealth 
quartiles. 
The differences in pension wealth by sex and marital status shown in table 
11.5 are large. We would expect that much of the difference can be attributed 
to differences in observable characteristics such as occupation, schooling, or 
lifetime attachment to the labor force. In table 11.6 we control for a number of 
factors that are likely to be correlated with pension wealth and examine the 
difference in the probability of  being covered by a pension  and in the (log) 
amount  of  pension  wealth  conditional on having  nonzero wealth.20 In both 
cases, even with controls for industry and occupation we continue to see large 
and significant differences by sex. Men are 6 percentage points more likely to 
have a pension, and conditional on having a pension, their pension wealth is 
42 percent  greater than that  of  women.  In table  11.4 the pension wealth  of 
women was less than half that of men. The addition of the other explanatory 
variables has thus explained a large fraction of the difference. The differences 
by race are smaller but significantly different from zero. Nonwhites are only 2 
percentage points less likely to have a pension than are whites, but the pension 
wealth of nonwhites is higher by 17 percent. 
Education beyond a four-year college degree is correlated with a mean in- 
crease in pension wealth of  38 percent.  Similarly, large differences hold be- 
tween those in excellent health  and those in poor health, although  again the 
differences in the multivariate  context are smaller than  in  the  simple cross- 
24. We note, however, there is a large difference in  the ratio of social security wealth to private 
wealth for the two groups, with whites having social security wealth equal to 34 percent of private 
wealth and the figure for nonwhites being 54 percent. 
25. Some annuity  wealth  may  be in joint and survivorship plans or in DC accounts, which 
can be willed to be an heir. No such difference is observed in  social security  wealth, which is 
not voluntary. 
26. The means of the regression  variables are reported in appendix table 1 lA.2. Table 11.6  Probability of Pension Wealth and  Amount 
Characteristic 
Linear Probability  Log of  Pension Wealth 
of  Pension  (over positive values) 
Standard  Standard 
Coefficient  Error  Coefficient  Error 
Demographics 
Age 
Sex (1 = male) 
Race (1 = nonwhite) 
Married 
Number of children 
Number of children*Sex 
Less than high school 



















Had previous job 
Hours (current) 
Health insurance (current) 
Health insurance (retiree) 
Household income 
Lowest quartile 
2d  quartile 
3d quartile 





4th quartile (omitted) 
No. of observations 









































































































































Note: Also included are 12 industry and 16 occupation dummy variables, homeownership dummy, 
age and work status interactions, tenure on the previous job, and dummy variables for missing 
values on health insurance, prior tenure, earnings, and firm  size. 480  Kathleen McGarry and Andrew Davenport 
tabulations in table 11.4. Large differences in pension wealth also persist by 
union status, government employment, firm size, and the presence of health in- 
surance. 
In table 11.7 we examine the entire distribution of household net worth, as 
well as the sum of  net worth and pensions. We note how the distribution of 
resources changes when pension wealth is included. In row  1 of the top panel 
we report the fraction of the total net worth of the population  that is held by 
each decile of the wealth distribution. If wealth were distributed equally, each 
decile would own  10 percent of the wealth. We  see here a distribution that is 
far from equal; over 50 percent of the wealth is held by the top 10 percent of 
the distribution. The top 30 percent holds 80 percent of the wealth. Net worth 
is negative for the bottom  10 percent. 
Rows 2, 3, and 4 show the distribution of  households by  sex and marital 
status. The numbers correspond to the percentage of each type of households 
in each decile (i.e., the rows sum to 100 percent). For example, 3.4 percent of 
all married couples have wealth that puts them in the lowest 10 percent of the 
wealth distribution. For single men the value is  13.4, and for single women, 
16.9. Certainly, we would expect couples to have higher wealth than singles if 
we do not control for household size, but within the population of single indi- 
viduals we see a substantial difference by sex as well. 
Rows 5 and 6 report the distribution by race. A huge fraction, 17.7 percent, 
of the nonwhite population is in the lowest decile, compared to just 5.4 percent 
of whites. Only 3.4 percent of  nonwhites are in the highest decile, compared 
to 14.0 percent of whites. 
We  now ask how pensions affect the distribution of  wealth. In the second 
panel we repeat the same exercise but divide the population of households into 
deciles based on total  private wealth  (net worth plus pensions). The overall 
distribution  of  wealth  holdings by  decile is similar,  although  there  is  some 
shifting away  from the highest decile. The wealth  shifted out of  the highest 
decile increases the portion held by  the remaining deciles, thus mitigating an 
overall measure of inequality. The fraction of  wealth held by  the bottom  30 
percent increases from 0.2 percent to  1.2 percent, while the fraction held by 
the top 30 percent decreases from 81.7 to 76.5 percent. 
As is apparent from several of the tables, a single woman is much less likely 
to have a pension than  either a single man  or a couple, and conditional on 
having a pension, its value is much lower. Examining rows 2, 3, and 4 of each 
panel  we  see  that  pension  wealth  worsens  the  inequality  faced  by  single 
women. The percentage of women in the highest decile falls from 5.3 percent 
in the first panel to 2.9 percent in the second, a fall of close to 50 percent. The 
percentage of couples in the highest category increases, and the percentage of 
single men slightly decreases. Comparing the top and bottom 30 percent, the 
portion of  single women in the bottom 30 percent of  the wealth distribution 
increases from 44.2 to 47.1 percent, while the percentage of single men in that 
portion of the distribution decreases from 44.3 to 40.9 percent. In the top 30 Table 11.7  Distribution of Household Net Worth and Net Worth Plus Pension Wealth (percentage of total in each decile) 
Decile 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1. Net worth 
Household type 
2. Married 
3. Single male 
4. Single female 
5. White 
6. Nonwhite 
1. Total net worth + pensions 
Household type 
2. Married 
3. Single male 




-0.8  0. I  0.9  2.0  3.3 
3.4  4.0  7.3  8.1  9.7 
13.4  17.2  13.7  11.3  10.7 
16.9  15.2  12.1  11.5  9.0 
5.4  6.2  8.2  8.8  9.4 
17.7  16.6  13.2  11.5  10.5 
-0.4  0.3  1.3  2.6  4.3 
Net Worth + Pension Wealth 
2.4  4.7  6.7  8.3  9.6 
16.5  13.6  10.8  10.0  7. I 
17.2  15.9  14.0  12.0  11.8 
4.9  7.0  7.9  8.8  9.7 
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percent, the fraction of women decreases from 19.9 to 13.7 percent, while the 
fraction of men increases from 20.0 to 21.9 percent. 
Changes in the distribution by race are less dramatic. The portion of  non- 
whites in the bottom 30 percent of the distribution is virtually unchanged, mov- 
ing from 47.5 to 47.3, while the portion in the top 30 percent increases slightly 
from 13.8 to 15.0 percent. 
11.5  Conclusion 
As this paper demonstrates, there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity 
in pension  holdings. Close to 40  percent  of the population  has  no pension 
wealth, while those in the highest decile have average pension wealth of over 
$400,000.  As the future of the social security system is brought into question, 
private pensions and wealth holdings become more important. Understanding 
the distributions of these assets will aid in determining appropriate policy op- 
tions for the continued public support of the retired population. 
Using the new HRS we find patterns of pension holdings that are consistent 
with earlier studies: Women have less pension wealth than men, and nonwhites 
have less pension wealth than whites-although  the differences by  race are 
slightly smaller than the differences by sex. In addition, workers in unionized 
jobs  and government  employees have greater pension coverage and pension 
wealth  than  other workers,  and  more educated  workers  have more pension 
wealth than the less educated. We then examine the ratio of pension wealth to 
total private wealth for subgroups of the population and find large differences 
between single women and either single men or married couples in the fraction 
of total wealth coming from pensions, but much smaller differences by race. 
We  demonstrate the relationship between pension wealth  and inequality  di- 
rectly  and  find that single women  in particular fare much  worse relative  to 
couples when pension wealth is included in the calculation of total wealth, but 
there is little change in the relative well-being of whites and nonwhites. The 
paucity of pension holdings among women suggests that their eventual well- 
being as widows will depend heavily on the resources left after the death of a 
spouse. Thus the issue of survivorship benefits for pensions will have important 
consequences for the eventual poverty rates of  widows. This will be investi- 
gated in future work. 483  Pensions and the Distribution of Wealth 
Appendix 
The construction of pension wealth for an individual required information on 
several components of the pension plan including, for example, age at which 
the individual expected to retire, expected benefit (in monetary terms or as a 
fraction of final salary), final salary, and so forth. In many cases information 
was available for most, but  not all, of  these items. Rather than discard  any 
observation with even a single missing data point, we imputed missing values 
for these questions. The imputations were based on linear regression models 
with the following regressors: age, race, sex, marital status, tenure on current 
job (or completed  tenure for past jobs), schooling, homeownership,  income 
and wealth  (in quartiles),  12 industry dummy variables,  and 16 occupation 
dummy variables. There was also a set of regressors used in a subset of imputa- 
tion equations. For example, in the equation used to predict firm contributions 
to DC plans, individual contributions  (when known) were used. The R2 for 
these regressions ranged from a low of 0.14 to a high of 0.76. Excluding obser- 
vations with imputed values from the calculations  in the paper did not alter 
any of the conclusions but did result in consistently higher estimates for pen- 
sion wealth. 
Table 11A. 1 lists the more important variables for which we imputed values, 
the number of values  imputed, and the number of valid responses  that were 
used to estimate the imputation equation. 
Table llA.l  Impution of Variables 
Variable Name 
Number of Valid  Number of  Imputed 
Responses  Responses  R’ 
Defined benefit plans 
Expected benefit  1,450 
Age expect to receive benefits  2,455 
Balance in account  1,061 
Individual contribution  1,263 
Firm contribution  886 
Age expect to receive benefits  1.06 I 
Defined contribution plans 
1,228  0.75 
24 1  0.40 
421  0.22 
184  0.15 
553  0.14 
421  0.22 484  Kathleen McGarry and Andrew Davenport 
Table llA.2  Means of Regression Variables (n = 7,837) 
Characteristic 
Standard 
Mean  Error 
Demographics 
Age 
Sex (1 = male) 
Race (1 = nonwhite) 
Married 
Number of children 
Number of children*Sex 
Less than high school 























Health insurance (retiree) 
Household finances 
Income in  1991 
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